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SUB-REGULATING ELECTIONS 
Jennifer Nou 
 
 
 
The revelation that a federal judge was reconsidering the partisan 
nature of voter identification laws renewed important debates about the 
capacity of courts to adjudicate election-related disputes.1  Chief among 
them were inquiries about the ability of litigants to present reliable 
information in judicial forums and that of judges to draw sound inferences 
from the evidence proffered.  How much voter fraud actually exists?  To 
what extent do identification requirements deter fraud as opposed to 
disenfranchise?  Many election law scholars, for their part, have long 
abandoned the courts as an arena for answering such questions.  In their 
view, not only are judges limited to the cramped records presented to them, 
but they also remain hopelessly mired in unproductive individual rights 
frameworks and vain searches for manageable standards, all the while 
cowed by potential political questions.2   
Consequently, the focus has turned instead to alternative institutions 
that may be better equipped to adjudicate election-related disputes.3  In the 
                                                 
  Neubauer Family Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.  Many thanks to Christopher 
Elmendorf, Heather Gerken, Aziz Huq, Dennis Hutchinson, Robert Glicksman, Michael Levin, Jonathan Masur, 
Eric Posner, Nicholas Stephanopolous and Geoffrey Stone for helpful conversations and comments on earlier 
drafts [more acknowledgements to come].  Gabe Broughton provided excellent research assistance.  
1 See Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 84-85 (Harvard 2013) (“I plead guilty to having written the 
majority opinion (affirmed by the Supreme Court) upholding Indiana’s requirement that prospective voters prove 
their identity with a photo ID—a type of law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of 
fraud prevention.”) 
2 See, for example, Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal 
Interregnum, 153 U Pa L Rev 503, 504 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 
Harv L Rev 593 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 Stan L Rev 643 (1998); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering 
and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 Colum L Rev 1325, 1330 (1987). 
3 See, for example, Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?  121 Yale L J 1808, 
1808 (2012); Heather K. Gerken and Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship, in 
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken, and Michael S. Kang, eds, Race, Reform, and Regulation of the 
Electoral Process: Recurring Puzzles in American Democracy 17, 26 (Cambridge 2011). 
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state-level redistricting context, for example, these “new institutional” 
proposals include shadow line-drawing entities, advisory commissions, and 
independent redistricting bodies.4  Their underlying rationales often parallel 
administrative law arguments in favor of delegating decisions to agencies 
over courts, whether on the grounds of superior legitimacy, accountability, 
or expertise.  Familiar questions of institutional independence and design 
also abound.5  It is thus surprising that more has not been made of the 
intersection between election and federal administrative law, 
notwithstanding some already valuable inroads.6   
Perhaps one explanation arises from the fact that administrative 
efforts at the federal level have thus far been timid and, as a result, there 
have been few circumstances in which to apply administrative law 
principles directly.7  Last Term’s decision in Arizona v. The Intertribal 
Council of Arizona, however, helps to highlight the need for more robust 
theories of federal election administration.8  A central issue in Intertribal 
was whether Arizona’s attempt to require proof-of-citizenship for a federal 
voter registration form violated the National Voter Registration Act.  The 
Act required that states “accept and use” the federal form.  The Court 
resolved the statutory ambiguity to mean that states could not require the 
submission of materials beyond those listed on the form by the Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC).  In reaching this determination, the Court 
                                                 
4 “New institutional” approaches, by and large, seek to “lessen the necessity of court intervention in politically 
sensitive election administration matters such as redistricting by harnessing politics to fix politics.”  Cain, 121 
Yale L J at 1808 (cited in note 3). See also Heather K. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Redistricting 
Reform, 5 Duke J Const L & Pub Pol 1, 7-9 (2010); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement 
through Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 NYU L Rev 1366, 1407-12 (2005); Jeffrey C. 
Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 Tex L Rev 837, 849-50 (1997); Note, A Federal 
Administrative Approach to Redistricting Reform, 121 Harv L Rev 1842, 1842 (2008). 
5 Both fields, for example, search for structures and processes that can best facilitate that independence, whether 
through removal restrictions, salary protections, appointments qualifications and so on.  See Rachel E. Barkow, 
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design, 89 Tex L Rev 15 (2010). 
6
 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 Election L J 412, 416–17 (2006) (examining 
potential benefits of “centralized, federal administrative review” for partisan gerrymandering efforts); Christopher 
S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An Overview, 5 Election L J 425, 443-44  (2006) 
(identifying as a valuable research question a “larger inquiry concerning how the policy choices of nominally 
independent bodies are affected by, inter alia, the body’s structure and powers”); Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way 
for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 Colum L Rev 708, 748 (2006) (suggesting that 
the Department of Justice should be understood as “an agency charged with administering a statute” for Voting 
Rights Act purposes); Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 Harv L Rev 95, 121-
23 (2013); Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in Charles, Gerken, and Kang, eds, Race, 
Reform, and Regulation of the Electoral Process 17, 26 (cited in note 3); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election 
Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 Yale L & Pol Rev 125, 135 (2009); Saul Zipkin, Administering Election 
Law, 95 Marq L Rev 641 (2012); Note, A Federal Administrative Approach to Redistricting Reform, 121 Harv L 
Rev 1842, 1843-44 (2008).  
7 Other possible explanations include the historical path dependency of state primacy over electoral regulation, 
the lack of existing federal infrastructure to monitor elections nationally, as well as the weak political will to 
establish robust federal electoral institutions.  See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth of Election 
Administration, 6 Election L J 118, 122-23 (2007) (reviewing Roy G. Saltman, The History and Politics of Voting 
Technology: In Quest of Integrity and Public Confidence (Palgrave 2006)). 
8 Arizona v Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc, No 12-71, slip op (June 17, 2013), online at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-71_7l48.pdf (visited Jan 10, 2013). 
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ignored the EAC executive director’s opinion letter concluding the same.  
The agency commissioners, for their part, had deadlocked on the 
interpretive question.  In the decision’s wake, Arizona, joined by Kansas, is 
currently engaged in litigation against the EAC under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).9     
 While Intertribal can be understood as a case about federalism, 
constitutional, or substantive election law, this article analyzes Intertribal 
through the lens of administrative law.  In doing so, it foregrounds an 
otherwise background electoral administrative agency, the EAC, and uses 
the case as a springboard to explore broader themes relevant to federal 
election administration.10  In particular, it puzzles through various analytical 
issues that arise when courts are called upon to resolve agency deadlocks on 
questions of statutory interpretation.  In light of such deadlocks, this article 
proposes an institutional understanding of Skidmore deference to 
interpretive documents prepared by politically insulated actors within 
election-related administrative agencies.11  Judicial deference, it posits, 
should give weight to the relative independence of agency staff when 
politically appointed officials are otherwise deadlocked.  To be clear, the 
claim is not that staff opinions and other guidance documents would require 
deference or overrule those of appointed commissioners.  Rather, the 
argument emphasizes that such views constitute an oft-overlooked source of 
expertise that would be prudent for judges to consider in electoral disputes.   
This approach would help to vindicate otherwise under-enforced 
constitutional norms by flipping the conventional wisdom granting greater 
interpretive deference to more politically accountable actors — in situations 
where such actors have failed, on partisan grounds, to resolve a statutory 
ambiguity themselves.  In this manner, the proposal is a second-best 
solution for courts required to resolve a statutory ambiguity when first-best 
answers are unavailable due to institutional constraints and internal agency 
politics.  As such, the proposal seeks to create greater incentives for internal 
agency independence in the presence of partisan deadlocks, as well as for 
the development of agency expertise through sub-regulatory materials — 
                                                 
9 See Kobach v. The United States Election Assistance Commission, 13-cv-04095 (D Kan 2013). 
10  The sphere of election administration, as defined here, includes the administration of statutes related to the 
conduct of elections, including the regulation of activities leading up to an election as well as those that occur on 
Election Day itself — a scope that parallels that of many administrative agencies abroad.  See Part 0.A. Others 
have adopted narrower definitions, but usually to address a different set of issues than those pursued here.  See, 
for example, Daniel P. Tokaji, Teaching Election Administration, 56 St Louis U L J 675, 675 (2012) (citing 
“voting technology, voter registration, voter identification, and the conduct of recounts” as representative election 
administration issues); David Schleicher, From Here All-The-Way-Down or How to Write a Festschrift Piece, 48 
Tulsa L Rev 401, 406 (2013) (defining “election administration” in terms of the “plumbing of the electoral system 
— vote counting, manning the polls, locating polling places, etc.).   
11 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944).  
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non-binding, but informative, guidance documents such as agency manuals, 
advisory notices, or opinion letters.12     
 To develop these ideas, Part I critically examines Intertribal’s 
background and reasoning.  Part II surveys federal election-related agencies 
and notes that many are structured to deadlock on partisan grounds.  Part III 
then considers how courts should treat reviewable election agency 
deadlocks, and in particular, how judges can benefit from agency expertise 
to resolve such ties.  Finally, Part IV reflects more broadly on how 
administrative law principles might be tailored to the electoral context. 
  
 
 
I. INTERTRIBAL’S IMPASSE 
 
 In December 2005, the Arizona Secretary of State’s office sent an 
email to the EAC with an inquiry.  The year before, Arizona voters had 
passed a ballot initiative requiring that voting registrants provide proof of 
their citizenship.13  Acceptable proof under the new state law included the 
applicant’s birth certificate or passport, naturalization papers, or driver’s 
license number.14  The Secretary of State asked whether the EAC could add 
this new Arizona requirement to the federal mail-in registration form that 
the EAC had developed under the National Voter Registration Act 
(NVRA).15  The federal form contained a section of state-specific 
instructions notifying state residents of what additional information they 
had to provide in order to register.16     
 The agency’s Executive Director refused Arizona’s request.17  His 
letter reasoned that the NVRA mandates that states “shall accept and use the 
mail voter registration application prescribed by the [EAC].”18  
Accordingly, the new Arizona requirements did not alter the state’s voter 
qualifications, but rather constituted an additional evidentiary requirement 
for a preexisting qualification (citizenship).  Such a state-imposed 
requirement on the federal form would effectively result in Arizona’s 
refusal to “accept and use” the EAC’s form as required by the NVRA.19  In 
the director’s view, states could not condition voter registration on the 
                                                 
12 See Mary Whisner, Some Guidance About Agency Guidance, 105 L Library J 385, 392 (2013) (characterizing 
“sub-regulatory guidance” as including “agency manuals, advisory notices, internal guidance to agency field 
inspectors, and letters from government officials to regulated entities.”) 
13 Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 16-166(F) (2006). 
14 Ariz Rev Stat Ann at § 16-166(F) 
15 42 USC § 1973gg-2(a)(2). 
16 See National Mail Voter Registration Form, *3-20, online at http://www.eac.gov (visited Jan 10, 2014) 
17 Letter from Exec Dir Thomas Wilkey to Sec of State, Jan Brewer (Mar 6, 2006). 
18 42 USC § 1973gg-6(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
19 42 USC § 1973gg-4(a)(1). 
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submission of materials beyond those exclusively demanded by the federal 
form.  The NVRA “regulated the area” and therefore preempted the state’s 
conflicting requirements.20   
 Despite this opinion letter, Arizona’s Secretary of State rejected the 
director’s interpretation and continued to enforce the state law to require the 
submission of proof-of-citizenship along with the federal form.21  The 
conflict continued in both the agency and the courts.  In May 2006, a 
consolidated group of plaintiffs, including private individuals, Indian tribes, 
and nonpartisan advocacy groups filed suit in district court to enjoin various 
practices under the state law.  The Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ 
emergency interlocutory injunction, only to later have the injunction 
vacated by the Supreme Court in Purcell v. Gonzalez.22  In a per curiam 
opinion, the Court emphasized the imminence of the then-upcoming 
election and the Court of Appeals’ failure to defer to the findings of the 
district court (which had not yet issued any factual findings and, as a result, 
left the Supreme Court with nothing more than a “bare order” to review).23  
After further litigation,24 a three-judge panel and the Ninth Circuit sitting en 
banc eventually held that the NVRA preempted Arizona’s conflicting law 
under the Elections Clause; Arizona could not require the submission of 
proof-of-citizenship along with the federal registration form. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.25 
 As the case was winding its way to the Court, the EAC’s four 
commissioners considered the legal matter in July 2006.  Their deliberations 
resulted in a debilitating tie: two commissioners (Democratic nominations) 
voted against the change and two (Republication nominations) voted in 
favor.26  Because the proposal required three votes for approval,27 the 
federal form was not amended.  Two of the commissioners released public 
                                                 
20 42 USC § 1973gg-4(a)(1). 
21 State Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, Arizona v Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc, No 12-71, *20 (June 17, 
2013). 
22 Gonzalez v Arizona, 485 F3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir 2007); Purcell v Gonzalez, 549 US 1 (2006) (per curiam). 
23 Gonzalez, 549 US at 5–6.  
24 On remand, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s initial denial of a preliminary injunction and held 
that the NVRA did not supersede Arizona’s state law. 485 F3d at 1049–51. The trial court therefore granted 
summary judgment to Arizona.   
25 568 U.S. __ (2012). 
26 See Office of Representative Nancy Pelosi, Press Release, Daschle, Pelosi Announce Nominations to Election 
Assistance Commission (May 28, 2003), available online at 
http://pelosi.house.gov/sites/pelosi.house.gov/files/pressarchives/releases/prDachlePelosiEAC052803.htm (visited 
Jan 14, 2014) (announcing nominations of Ray Martinez and Gracia Hillman by Democratic House and Senate 
leaders); US Election Assistance Commission, Certification, In the Matter of Arizona Request for Information 
(July 31, 2006), available online at http://archives.eac.gov/voter/docs/az-tally-vote.pdf/attachment_download/file 
(visited Jan 10, 2014); Joint Appendix, Arizona v Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 2012 WL 6198263, *222–42 
(2012). 
27 42 USC § 15328. 
6 
 
statements regarding the basis for their votes, underscoring the 
contentiousness of the outcome.28   
 After the agency’s deadlocked vote, Arizona took no further action 
with respect to the EAC — a fact Justice Scalia later emphasized at oral 
argument and in his eventual majority opinion.29  Justice Scalia agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit that the NVRA’s “accept and use” provision precluded 
state-imposed registration requirements without EAC approval.  On the one 
hand, Congress could preemptively regulate how federal elections were 
conducted under the Elections Clause; in this sense, the so-called 
presumption against preemption did not apply.  Rather, Congress’ power 
under the Election’s Clause was broad.  Its substantive reach extended over 
the “times, places, and manner” of federal elections — “comprehensive 
words” which “embrace authority to provide a comprehensive code for 
congressional elections,” including regulations over federal voter 
registration.30   
On the other hand, the Court also made clear that states retained the 
power to determine which voters were qualified to vote, potentially limiting 
previous case law regarding the scope of Congress’ ability to determine 
voter qualifications.31  How and where to draw this line — between a 
substantive qualification and a mere procedural regulation over the 
“manner” of federal elections subject to federal oversight — will almost 
surely be the subject of future litigation.  One argument left open to Arizona 
on this question (but raised too late in the case) was that the state’s proof-
of-citizenship registration requirement was itself a qualification to vote.32   
Justice Scalia suggested another possibility as well: that the state’s 
authority to establish voter qualifications also included the power to 
demand the information required for the state’s effective enforcement of its 
own qualifications.33  Pointing to another NVRA provision declaring that 
the EAC-prescribed application “may require only such identifying 
                                                 
28 Commissioner Ray Martinez, III, a Democratic nominee, argued that reversing the agency’s previous legal 
position regarding the NVRA would create inconsistencies and confusion in other states and was, in any event, 
premature given the likelihood of pending judicial resolution.  Finally, he worried about the EAC’s institutional 
credibility.  Until this vote, the EAC commissioners had always been able to achieve unanimity, and he feared that 
the outcome would be perceived as an “overly partisan federal agency that is more prone to deadlock” than to 
fulfilling its mission.   Joint Appendix, 2012 WL 6198263 at 229-39. 
  Commissioner Paul DeGregorio, the EAC chairman and a Republican nominee, expressed his agreement 
with a district court opinion considering the issue and concluded that Arizona’s attempt to require proof-of-
citizenship did not violate the NVRA.  Id at 223. He cited his own personal experience as an election 
administrator in recounting registration applications that could not be finalized due to voters’ failure to supply 
missing information.  Thus, “leaving out key instructions on the National Voter Registration Form was likely to 
cause more steps for the voters and possibly keep them from being able to cast a ballot.”  Id at 224–25. In his 
view, consolidating the federal and state requirements into one form would be more efficient and increase the 
number of validly cast ballots.   
29 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op at 16–17. 
30 Id at 16-17. 
31 Id at 13.  See, for example, Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970). 
32 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op at 15 n 9. 
33 Id at 15. 
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information” as is “necessary” to determine “eligibility,”34 Justice Scalia 
suggested that the statute might be read to require the inclusion of 
information essential to meaningful enforcement.  In this manner, he 
effectively encouraged Arizona to bring suit (which it did) arguing that the 
EAC had a “nondiscretionary duty” to include citizenship information as 
“necessary” to enforce Arizona’s voter qualifications.35  EAC’s inaction on 
or arbitrary rejection of the claim would then be subject to judicial review 
under the APA.36  In a footnote, Justice Scalia further noted that the EAC 
lacked any active commissioners at the time, and wondered whether a court 
could compel agency action despite the agency’s lack of leadership.37 
 For Justices Thomas and Alito, in dissent, the questions raised by 
Intertribal did not need to be resolved in administrative forums like the 
EAC, but rather could and should be settled in courts without bureaucratic 
involvement.  Justice Alito, for his part, accused the majority of “send[ing] 
the State to traverse a veritable procedural obstacle course.”38  Justice 
Thomas agreed.39  Both Justices then took pains to point out that the EAC at 
the time was plagued by vacancies, with the lack of a quorum rendering the 
commission but an “empty shell.”40   
 Intertribal can thus be seen as an attempt by the majority to shift 
back to an administrative agency, rather than a court, questions it thought 
better suited for an initial administrative determination.  Among them: What 
kind of scheme — attestation backed by perjury prosecutions or formal 
documentation — is “necessary” for legitimately establishing voter 
eligibility?  What kind of information would properly “effectuate” a 
citizenship requirement?  Answers to such questions would require data and 
evidence that agencies would be better situated to gather relative to judicial 
forums, subject to the constraints of administrative law.  
 
 
                                                 
34 Id at 12, 15–17. 
35 Id at 16–17. 
36 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op at 16–17.  
37 Id. at 17, n. 10. 
38 Id at 6 (Alito dissenting). 
39 Inter Tribal Council, No 12-71, slip op 16–17 (Thomas dissenting) (“Offering a nonexistent pathway to 
administrative relief is an exercise in futility, not constitutional avoidance.”). 
40 Id at 17 (Thomas dissenting); id at 6 (Alito dissenting).  Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy wrote 
separately to emphasize his view that the presumption against preemption should play no less of a role in the 
electoral context.  Id at 1–2 (Kennedy concurring).  To him, the cautionary presumption played an important part 
when interpreting a federal statute’s boundaries and the Elections Clause was no different than other enumerated 
powers like the commerce or bankruptcy power, where the presumption still applied.  Justice Kennedy also made 
a pragmatic observation: States largely bear the expenses of holding federal elections, since state and federal 
election processes usually overlap in practice.  The same voters usually use the same ballots, that is, when 
choosing both state and federal officials.  As a result, states still maintained an important interest in federal 
elections given this administrative overlap.  Id at 2. 
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II. ELECTION-RELATED AGENCIES 
 
 
As context, American federal elections are currently administered by 
a patchwork of federal agencies in collaboration with state and local 
governments, which still bear the bulk of administrative responsibilities on 
the ground.41  While states are constitutionally charged with providing for 
the “times, places, and manner” of federal elections in the first instance, 
Congress has exercised its power to “make or alter” these regulations 
selectively — most notably in the areas of campaign finance,42 anti-
discrimination,43 ballot provision,44 vote-counting-technology, and voter 
registration by both domestic45 and overseas voters.46  While these federal 
responsibilities are non-trivial, it is worth noting that they pale in 
comparison to the more comprehensive and centralized schemes of other 
countries.47   
Congress, in turn, has delegated many of these election-related 
responsibilities to a constellation of federal administrative agencies, notable 
for their structural and substantive heterogeneity.  Some of these agencies, 
                                                 
41 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 
44 Ind L Rev 113, 117 (2010) (explaining that “election administration remains mostly a matter of state law and 
local practice, as has been the case throughout U.S. history” and “[a]uthority is largely devolved to the fifty chief 
election officials in the states and to thousands of local election officials at the state and local level.”)  
42 See, for example, Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended at 2 USC § 431 et seq.  In Buckley v 
Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976), the Supreme Court assumed plenary congressional power over federal election 
campaigns and campaign finance based on the Elections Clause.  Buckley, 424 US at 13. 
43 Voting Rights Act, 42 USC § 1973 (2011). 
44 The 1975 Amendments to VRA require jurisdictions to provide ballots and instructions in language of covered 
language-minority groups when particular population conditions exist.  A number of federal statutes concern 
electoral access by the disabled, including the 1982 amendment to the VRA, the Voting Accessibility for the 
Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984. 
45 See National Voter Registration Act, 42 USC §§ 1973gg –1973gg-10 (2006); Help America Vote Act of 2002, 
42 USC § 15301 et seq. (2002). 
46 Members of the uniformed services and U.S. citizens who live abroad are eligible to register and vote absentee 
in federal elections under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA, Pub L 
No 99-410). Since 1942, a number of federal laws have been enacted to assist these voters: the Soldier Voting Act 
of 1942 (Pub L No 77-712, amended in 1944), the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 (Pub L No 84-296), the 
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 (Pub L No 94-203; both the 1955 and 1975 laws were amended in 
1978 to improve procedures), and the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986.   
47 India’s unitary election commission, for example, is constitutionally vested with broad authority over election-
related matters.  India Const Art 324.  It has used its power to promulgate a Model Code of Conduct as well as to 
issue robust regulations governing the disclosure of campaign expenses, election schedules, polling and counting 
locations, among other matters.   See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An 
Overview, 5 Election L J 425, 429; Tokaji, 44 Ind L Rev at 122–23 (cited in note 41); see also Election 
Commission of India, About ECI, online at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/the_setup.aspx (visited Oct 16, 2013).  
Similarly, Canada’s single national election commission has broad authority to implement and enforce electoral 
legislation, including campaign finance laws; maintain a national registry of electors; oversee the registration of 
political parties; monitor election spending and financial returns; train election administrators; and provide 
technical support to independent redistricting commissions.  See Jean-Pierre Kingsley, The Administration of 
Canada’s Independent, Non-Partisan Approach, 3 Election L J 406 (2004).  The powers of the United Kingdom’s 
Electoral Commission are similarly capacious.  See Elmendorf, 5 Election L J 425, 426-427 (cited in note 49); see 
also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U Chi L Rev 769, 780–86 (2013) (surveying 
non-American institutional models of election administration).   
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for example, have traditionally independent features such as for-cause 
removal restrictions and multi-member boards, while others are more 
recognizably executive in nature through at-will removal of their agency 
heads by the President.48  At the fore, these agencies include the EAC 
involved in Intertribal, the Federal Election Commission, the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Defense.49   
 
A. Independent Commissions 
 
 More specifically, the EAC and the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) are both independent agencies with a distinctive design feature: both 
are normally headed by an even number of commissioners with staggered 
terms, equally split between two political parties in practice.  Specifically, 
the EAC usually consists of four members, two of whom are Republicans 
and two of whom are Democrats.50  Each serves four-year staggered 
terms.51  The EAC commissioners, in turn, choose a chair and vice chair, 
who also cannot be from the same political party.52  The FEC is similarly 
composed of six members with six-year staggered terms, no more than three 
of whom can be affiliated with the same political party.53  The FEC 
                                                 
48 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex L Rev 15, 
38-39 (2010). 
49 Other agencies are tangentially involved in federal election regulation, but this article focuses on the four 
mentioned here.  While the FEC takes the lead on campaign finance enforcement and administration, for example, 
it coordinates with a number of other federal agencies as well and refers criminal prosecutions under FECA to the 
Department of Justice.  In addition, the Department of Treasury oversees public funds disbursement for 
presidential candidates certified by the FEC as statutorily eligible, while the Internal Revenue Service reviews 
FEC regulations for consistency with the tax code, determines whether an organization’s tax status is consistent 
with its political activities as well as which political activities result in taxable income.  Finally, the Federal 
Communications Commission also oversees broadcaster compliance with the provision of reasonable access to 
broadcast time for federal candidates.  See Maurice C. Sheppard, The Federal Election Commission: Policy, 
Politics, and Administration, 61–63 (UPA 2007). 
50 See 42 USC § 15323(a) (specifying that members drawn from recommendations submitted by “the Majority 
Leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Minority Leader of the Senate, and the 
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives . . . with respect to each vacancy on the Commission affiliated 
with the political party of the Member of Congress involved”); see also Tokaji, 28 Yale L & Pol Rev at 134 (cited 
in note 6).(“Bipartisan by statute, the EAC includes two commissioners from each of the major parties.”). 
51 See 42 USC § 15323(b)(1). 
52 See 42 USC § 15323(c) (“The Commission shall select a chair and vice chair from among its members for a 
term of 1 year, except that the chair and vice chair may not be affiliated with the same political party.”) 
53 See 2 USC § 437c(a)(1) (providing that “[n]o more than 3 members of the [Federal Election] Commission 
appointed under this paragraph may be affiliated with the same political party.”); 2 USC § 437c(a)(2)(A) (2006) 
(specifying six FEC commissioners with six-year terms).  No independent or member of a third party has ever 
been appointed. See Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence 
and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission, 1 Election L J 145, 158 n 97 (2002).  Interestingly, 
lower courts have implied for-cause protection for the FEC. See FEC v NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F3d 821, 
826 (DC Cir 1993). 
10 
 
commissioners also choose a chair and vice chair from different political 
parties.54   
 
 1.  Election Assistance Commission. — In addition to its four 
commissioners, the EAC is also statutorily authorized to have an executive 
director, a general counsel and other professional staff.55  The Help America 
Vote Act (HAVA) also created three representative advisory committees 
called the Technical Guidelines Development Committee, Standards Board, 
and the Board of Advisors.56  As a substantive matter, HAVA granted the 
EAC the authority to disburse payments to states to replace voting systems 
as well as to provide guidance regarding voting system standards, testing, 
and certification.  More generally, the statute directs the EAC to serve as a 
“clearinghouse” for election administration data and best practices.57  
HAVA explicitly denies the EAC authority, however, to issue any rules or 
regulations under the statute,58 except in the narrow context of the mail-in 
voting process at issue in Intertribal.59  The Attorney General, in turn, is 
authorized to enforce the statute and bring suits for declaratory or injunctive 
relief accordingly.60    
 
 2.  Federal Election Commission. — Apart from its six 
commissioners, the FEC also has a staff director and general counsel 
appointed by the commission, an inspector general, a chief financial officer, 
as well as a chief information officer.61  Substantively, the FEC administers 
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which imposes caps on 
election spending, limits individual candidate contributions, and requires 
                                                 
54 See 2 USC § 437c(a)(5) (“The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from among its 
members  . . . for a term of one year . . . . The chairman and the vice chairman shall not be affiliated with the same 
political party.”). 
55 42 USC § 15324. 
56 The Technical Guidelines committee is chaired by the director of NIST and 14 other members appointed jointly 
by NIST and the EAC.  The Standards Board has 110 members, 55 of whom are chosen by state chief election 
officers and the other half by local election officials.  Finally, the Board of Advisors has 37 members drawn from 
state and local government associations, the Architectural and Transportation Barrier Compliance Board, and 
other federal agencies and congressional committees with election oversight responsibilities.  See Election 
Assistance Commission, Board of Advisors, online at http://www.eac.gov/about_the_eac/board_of_advisors.aspx 
(last visited Jan 14, 2014). 
57 See 42 USC §§ 15322; Vassia Gueorguieva, Election Administration Bodies and Implementation Tools, 13 Geo 
Pub Pol Rev 95, 103 (2008); Ray Martinez III, Is the Election Assistance Commission Worth Keeping? 12 Election 
L J 190, 191 (2013) (“Unlike most federal independent agencies, the EAC was created as a non-regulatory body, 
designed primarily to serve as a national clearinghouse of election administration best practices and to distribute 
federal funds to state and local jurisdictions.”). 
58 42 USC § 15329 (“The Commission shall not have any authority to issue any rule, promulgate any regulation, 
or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any State or unit of local government, except to the 
extent permitted under [the mail-in voter registration form provision].”). 
59 See 42 USC § 1973gg-7(a). 
60 42 USC § 15511. 
61 See 2 USC 437c(f); Federal Election Commission, FEC Offices, online at 
http://www.fec.gov/about/offices/offices.shtml (visited Dec 4, 2013); Sheppard, The Federal Election Commission 
at 63–64 (cited in note 49). 
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various candidate and political action committee disclosures.62  The 
Commission administers the provisions through both rulemaking and 
adjudication and facilitates enforcement actions in conjunction with the 
DOJ.63  The FEC also periodically issues advisory opinions, which are 
generated in response to requests by parties, candidates, and other 
potentially regulated entities.64   
 
 
*** 
 
 Formal agency action for both the EAC and FEC, in turn, normally 
requires the bi-partisan majority approval of the agencies’ commissioners.  
The FEC, for its part, requires a majority of commissioners to agree when 
making, amending, or repealing rules; issuing advisory opinions; or 
approving enforcement actions.65  This requirement usually requires the 
assent of four of the FEC’s six commissioners.66  The EAC, in turn, requires 
three-member approval for its actions — typically a majority of its four 
commissioners.67  When coupled with the agency’s partisan balancing 
requirements, these voting rules help to ensure that the agencies deadlock in 
the absence of bipartisan agreement.  Moreover, a tie-vote for the FEC and 
EAC means that the proposed action does not proceed.  By contrast, a tie-
vote for the International Trade Commission (one of the only other 
rulemaking agencies with an even-numbered, bipartisan commission 
structure) means that an investigation proceeds.68  As such, both the FEC 
and EAC are structurally biased in favor of the status quo.69   
                                                 
62 See Gueorguieva, 13 Geo Pub Pol Rev at 96–97 (cited in note 57); Sheppard, The Federal Election 
Commission at 60 (cited in note 49). 
63 2 USC § 437d(a)(8). See Gueorguieva, 13 Geo Pub Pol Rev at 100 (cited in note 57). 
64 2 USC § 437f.   
65 See 2 USC § 437c(a)(2)(c) (“All decisions of the Commission with respect to the exercise of its duties and 
powers under the provisions of this Act shall be made by a majority vote of the members of the [Federal Election] 
Commission”); see also R. Sam Garrett, Deadlocked Votes among Members of the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC): Overview and Potential Considerations for Congress 1 (Congressional Research Service, 2009), online at 
http://www.bradblog.com/wp-content/uploads/CRS_FEC_Deadlocks.pdf (visited Jan 10, 2014). 
66 Three commissioners may be sufficient, however, when there are vacancies, as long as the FEC fulfills its 
internally-mandated four-member quorum.  See Rules of Procedure of the Federal Election Commission Pursuant 
to 2 U.S.C. § 437(c)(e), online at http://www.fec.gov/directives/directive_10.pdf (last visited Jan 12, 2014). 
67 See 42 USC § 15328 (stating that “[a]ny action which the [Election Assistance] Commission is authorized to 
carry out under this chapter may be carried out only with the approval of at least three of its members”).  This rule 
could require potential unanimity under the agency’s informal three-member quorum requirement.  See, e.g., 
Election Assistance Commission, Work Continues at the EAC, online at 
http://www.eac.gov/blogs/work_continues_at_the_eac/ (Dec 14, 2011) (“A quorum (at least three commissioners) 
is required to determine new EAC policies, defined as ‘high level determinations, setting an overall agency 
goal/objective or otherwise setting rules, guidance or guidelines at the highest level.’”) (last visited Jan 12, 2014).  
This reading would be consistent with the statutory text requiring the approval of at least “three” EAC members 
for formal agency actions. 
68 19 USC § 1330(d)(5).  Besides the FEC and EAC, the only two other agencies that appear to have even-
numbered commissions are the International Trade Commission and the Commission on Civil Rights. See 19 USC 
§ 1330(a), (c) (2006) (six members on the International Trade Commission, not more than three of whom can be 
members of the same political party); 42 USC § 1975(b) (2006) (eight members on the Commission on Civil 
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On the one hand, these agencies’ bipartisan-vote requirements 
reflect lofty legislative aspirations.  The FECA House Report, for example, 
cites the dangers of “partisan misuse” and the hope that the FEC’s majority-
vote requirement would help to ensure a “mature and considered 
judgment.”70  On the other hand, the decision rules also invites intractable 
impasses, particularly over significant and high-profile issues.71  The EAC, 
for example, deadlocked 2-2 on Intertribal’s question of whether to include 
Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirements on the federal registration 
form.  One commenter derided the outcome as a “partisan stalemate” in the 
“one area” where the agency had regulatory authority.72   
 
 
B. Executive Agencies 
 
By comparison, there are also two prominent executive agencies 
with single presidentially-appointed and senate-confirmed heads, the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Defense.  While both federal 
agencies also regulate elections, their scope and structure differ from the 
FEC and EAC in important ways. 
   
1.  Department of Justice — The Department of Justice has been 
charged with helping to enforce a number of election-related statutes, 
including (what is left of) the Voting Rights Act (VRA).73  Before Shelby 
                                                                                                                            
Rights, not more than four of whom can be from the same political party). The Commission on Civil Rights is 
primarily a fact-finding agency and periodically issues reports regarding civil rights policy and enforcement, 
serves as an information clearinghouse, and prepares public service announcement and advertising campaigns to 
discourage civil rights violations. See 42 USC § 1975a. 
69 Marian Wang, As Political Groups Push Envelope, FEC Gridlock Gives “De Facto Green Light” (ProPublica 
Nov 7, 2011), online at http://www.propublica.org/article/as-political-donors-push-envelope-fec-gridlock-gives-
de-facto-green-light/single (visited Jan 10, 2014) (“Ultimately, the FEC is set up in such a way that when the 
commissioners deadlock, one side comes away with a de-facto win — the side seeking to preserve the status 
quo.”).  
70 See also Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, HR Rep No 94-917, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 3 
(1976). 
71 See Garrett, Deadlocked Votes at 4 (cited in note 65) (“Those issues on which deadlocks occurred . .  . featured 
strong disagreement among Commissioners and reflected apparently unsettled positions on some major policy 
questions, such as political committee status, when particular activities triggered filing requirements or other 
regulation, and questions related to investigations and other enforcement matters. In addition, the deadlocks that 
did occur always fell along partisan lines.”). 
72 See Tokaji, 28 Yale L & Pol Rev at 135 (cited in note 6).  See also Gueorguieva, 13 Geo Pub Pol Rev at 101–
02; Press Release, FEC Deadlocks On Attempted Evasion of Disclosure Laws (Campaign Legal Center June 14, 
2012), online at 
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1766:june-14-2012-fec-
deadlocks-on-attempted-evasion-of-disclosure-laws&catid=63:legal-center-press-releases&Itemid=61 (visited Jan 
10, 2014). 
73 In addition to the VRA discussed here, the Attorney General is also authorized to bring civil actions to enforce 
a number of other election-related statutes, such as the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, the 
National Voter Registration Act, and the Help America Vote Act’s provisions requiring states to provide uniform 
and nondiscriminatory election technology. 
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County invalidated VRA Section Four’s coverage formula,74 the agency 
administered Section Five’s preclearance regime for jurisdictions covered 
by the formula.  Those jurisdictions had to affirmatively demonstrate that 
the changes would “neither ha[ve] the purpose nor . . . the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”75  While covered 
jurisdictions could submit their voting changes to the DOJ or a federal 
district court in Washington, D.C., more than 99 percent of the preclearance 
requests were submitted for DOJ administrative review.76   
 The current case law would make it difficult for the DOJ to 
successfully claim legislative rulemaking authority under Section Five — 
and indeed the DOJ has not done so, explicitly treating its regulations as 
guidelines.77  Moreover, Section Five provides that litigants can bypass the 
DOJ administrative process to vindicate their claims directly in a judicial 
forum, further suggesting that Congress intended for the courts to play a 
primary interpretive role as well; the DOJ’s own regulations refer to the 
DOJ as a judicial “surrogate.”78  Finally, the text of Section Five also does 
not explicitly grant DOJ rulemaking power,79 and the Attorney General’s 
preclearance denial letters lack precedential value.80   
 While Section Five is currently a hollow shell in Shelby County’s 
wake, the DOJ also enforces Section Two of the VRA, which bans electoral 
structures that result in members of a class of citizens defined by race or 
color “hav[ing] less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.”81  As such, Section Two is a nationally applicable prohibition 
against voting practices and procedures that discriminate on the basis of 
race, color, or language minority group.  It has been used, for example, to 
challenge redistricting plans and at-large election systems, poll worker 
hiring, and voter registration procedures.  It prohibits not only election-
related practices that are intended to be racially discriminatory, but also 
                                                 
74 See Shelby County v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013). 
75 42 USC § 1973c (West 2011).   
76 See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Oversight and Review Division, A Review of the 
Operations of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division 13 (March 2013), online at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2013/s1303.pdf (visited Jan 10, 2014) (ascribing rates to the fact that the 
“Department’s administrative reviews are less expensive for the covered jurisdiction and generally result in a 
faster outcome”) (hereinafter, Review of the Voting Section).   
77 See Revisions of the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 75 Fed Reg 
33205 (proposed June 11, 2010) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts 0 and 51), citing 5 USC § 301.   
78 42 USC § 1973c; 28 CFR § 51.52. 
79 42 USC § 1973c.  Section 12(d) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to file suit to enjoin violations of 
Section 5. 
80 See United States v Mead Corp, 533 US 218, 232 (denying Chevron deference to tariff rulings on the grounds 
that they were not “the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling”). 
See also Krousser, 86 Tex L Rev at 683 (cited in note 155) (characterizing DOJ as restricted to the issuance of 
guidelines as opposed to “rules” and noting that “its objection letters [do] not have precedential force”). 
81 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2006)).   
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those that are shown to have a racially discriminatory impact.82  The Act 
allows the Attorney General, as well as private citizens, to bring suit to 
obtain court-ordered remedies.83  The provision does not explicitly provide 
the DOJ with binding rulemaking authority, nor does the DOJ claim any.84   
 Finally, in terms of staffing, what is striking about the DOJ is the 
extent to which many of the agency’s election-related administrative duties 
are carried out by its career civil servants.  The Civil Rights Division within 
the DOJ, for example, contains a dedicated Voting Section, which has had 
about 35-40 career attorneys at any given time.85 In all, the unit has about a 
hundred employees, comprising attorneys, social scientists, civil rights 
analysts, and support personnel.86   
 
 
 2.  Department of Defense — Like the DOJ, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) is another executive branch agency, with a presidentially-
nominated and senate-confirmed head.  The DOD has sub-delegated its 
election-related duties, however, to the director of the DOD’s Federal 
Voting Assistance Program (FVAP).87  Substantively, FVAP is charged 
with administering statutes related to voting by citizens and military 
personnel overseas.88  The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 
Voting Act, for example, provides for a federal registration application, 
which allows qualified citizens abroad to register to vote and request an 
absentee ballot simultaneously.89  Other FVAP responsibilities include 
developing and implementing voter registration procedures at army 
recruitment offices.90 
                                                 
82 42 USC §§ 1973–1973bb-1. 
83 42 USC § 1973. 
84 42 USC § 1973.  The DOJ also helps to administer other lesser-known sections of the VRA, including Sections 
3 and Section 8, which grant both the federal courts and the Attorney General the authority to certify counties to 
allow for the assignment of federal election observers, which can include DOJ staff. 42 USC § 1973(b).  Sections 
203 and 4(f)(4), in turn, are the language minority provisions of the Act, which require covered jurisdictions to 
provide bilingual written materials. 42 USC § 1973aa–1a(a). The DOJ has issued a guidance document to 
facilitate compliance. See 28 CFR 55, online at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_203/28CFRPart55.pdf 
(visited Jan 10, 2014). Finally, Section 208 of the Act, allows voters who require assistance to vote by reason of 
blindness, disability, or inability to read or write to receive that assistance by an individual of the voters’ 
choosing— as long as the individual is not the voter’s employer or union representative. 42 USC § 1973aa-6.   
85 See Department of Justice, Review of the Voting Section at 9 (cited in note 76). The number of attorneys during 
this time has fluctuated slightly beyond this range, with 31 attorneys in 1998 and 45 in 2010.  
86 Id (cited in note 76). 
87 See Exec Order No 12,642, 53 Fed Reg 21,975 (June 8, 1988) (designating Secretary of Defense as 
presidential designee under Act and allowing Secretary to sub-delegate within the Department of Defense). ; 
Federal Voting Assistance Program, About FVAP, online at http://www.fvap.gov/info/about (visited Jan 10, 2014).  
88 42 USC §§ 1973ff–1973ff-6 (2006) (allowing for presidential sub-delegation of duties). 
89 Pub L No 99-410.   
90 In 2009, Congress further expanded UOCAVA’s protections for overseas voting through the Military and 
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, which imposes a specific deadline of forty-five days before Election Day for 
states to transmit validly-requested absentee ballots unless a state could show hardship.  The statute also prohibits 
states from imposing a ballot notarization requirement.  Pub L No 111-84, §§ 578–79, 123 Stat 2190, 2321–22 
(2009) (codified as amended at 42 USC § 1973ff-1(a)(7)–(8) (2006 & Supp V 2012)).  Pursuant to these 
authorities, the DOD has issued guidance establishing its polices and assigning responsibilities for implementing 
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III. DEFERENCE AND DEADLOCKS 
 
 With independent commissions structured to deadlock and executive 
branch agencies largely deprived of legislative rulemaking power, the 
emerging portrait of federal election administration is one in which some of 
the most important election-related statutes are being implemented, if at all, 
by courts.  Federal administrators, by contrast, have been relegated to the 
sidelines despite their ability to collect cross-cutting data from multiple 
sources and to provide expert guidance beyond that provided by self-
interested litigants.   
This Part considers how courts should interpret election-related 
statutes in light of agencies’ comparative expertise and structural incentives 
to deadlock.  It suggests that deference should be calibrated to the 
institutional role of the actors authoring the interpretive documents and, 
specifically, the degree to which they are internally politically insulated.  In 
this sense, it seeks to develop the idea of internal agency independence and, 
in doing so, to help foster legitimate tie-breaking considerations.   
 
 
A. Tie-breakers 
 
Agency deadlocks of the kind that plagued the EAC in Intertribal 
pose an especially pernicious set of problems for election administration, 
and administrative law more generally.  Deadlocks stymie the often swift 
and decisive resolution critically necessary before an impending election, 
especially given the risks of instability or perceived illegitimacy.  Some, for 
example, have defended the Supreme Court’s intervention in Bush v. Gore 
on the grounds that, barring all else, it provided a final resolution that 
helped to preserve stability and order.91  In Intertribal, the imminence of 
                                                                                                                            
voter assistance offices as well as developing procedures for persons to apply to register to vote at military 
recruitment offices.  See Department of Defense, Federal Voting Assistance Program, Instruction No 1000.04 
(Sept 13, 2012), online at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/100004p.pdf (visited Jan 10, 2014).    
Other related statutes include the Soldier Voting Act of 1942, Pub L No 77-712, amended in 1944; the Federal 
Voting Assistance Act of 1955, Pub L No 84-296; and the 1975 Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act, Pub L No 
94-203.    
91 531 US 98 (2000). See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U Chi L Rev 695, 715 (2001) 
(exploring Bush v. Gore through cultural lens that “‘democracy’ required judicially-ensured order, stability, and 
certainty”). 
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Arizona’s impending election was cited to justify an expedited agency 
procedure in the hopes of providing a final resolution for various states.92   
 Administrative deadlocks also undermine the implementation of 
duly-enacted laws and judicial decisions.  In this sense, they can foil 
otherwise legitimate acts through administrative impasse.  Deadlocks 
resulting in agency inaction can also have pernicious electoral 
consequences.  To take one extreme example, because Illinois politicians in 
the early 1960s deadlocked over a new redistricting plan for the state 
legislature in light of new census data, all 236 candidates for 177 seats 
ended up running together in a single, at-large race.93  More recently, the 
FEC has witnessed a string of 3-3 votes along party lines, with some 
empirical evidence suggesting a recent uptick in deadlocks for proposed 
enforcement actions, audits, and rulemakings.94  Among the most 
controversial have been those preventing the FEC from promulgating 
meaningful disclosure rules in response to Citizens United, which upheld 
the statutory disclosure provisions at issue.95  At one point, the impasse was 
so protracted that the commissioners could not even agree to accept public 
comments, though it eventually issued broad questions about possible 
regulatory approaches.96    A final rule has yet to be issued. 
 The twin challenges for federal election administration, then, are 
how to facilitate the application of high-quality information to the 
development of electoral regulatory policy while also resolving agency 
                                                 
92 Statement of EAC Chairman Paul DeGregorio, Joint Appendix, 2012 WL 6198263 at 225 (“I was also very 
concerned that with the August 14, 2006, voter registration deadline for the Arizona primary election fast 
approaching, that time was of the essence on this issue.”) 
93 See Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U Chi L Rev 1661, 1684–85 (2010) (discussing example). 
94 See Christopher Rowland, Deadlock by Design Hobbles Election Agency, Boston Globe (July 7, 2013), online 
at http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/07/06/america-campaign-finance-watchdog-rendered-nearly-
toothless-its-own-appointed-commissioners/44zZoJwnzEHyzxTByNL2QP/story.html#share-nav (noting that the 
“frequency of deadlocked votes resulting in dismissed cases . . . has shot up, to 19 percent, from less than 1 
percent”); Roiled in Partisan Deadlock, Federal Election Commission Is Failing (Public Citizen 2013), online at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/fec-deadlock-statement-and-chart-january-2013.pdf (visited Jan 10, 2014) 
(compiling data); Garrett, Deadlocked Votes at 4–6 (cited in note 65) (displaying data on frequency of FEC 
deadlock from July 2008-July 2009). 
95 See, for example, Bernie Becker, Election Commission Decisions Deadlocking on Party Lines, NY Times A16 
(Sept 27, 2009); Marian Wang, FEC Deadlocks (Again) on Guidance for Big-Money Super PACs (ProPublica Dec 
2, 2011), online at http://www.propublica.org/article/deadlocks-again-on-guidance-for-big-money-super-pacs 
(visited Jan 10, 2014); Kathleen Ronayne, Federal Election Commission Deadlocks in Discussions about New 
Disclosure Rules for Political Advertisements, Open Secrets Blog (June 16, 2011), online at http:// 
www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/06/federal-election-commission-deadlocks.html (visited Jan 10, 2014); Kenneth 
P. Doyle, Bauerly: FEC to Vote Again on Launch Of Rulemaking to Adjust to Citizens United, Daily Rep Exec 
(BNA)  No 11, at A-13 (June 10, 2011) (“The commissioners deadlocked 3-3 in a party-line vote on whether to 
move forward with a new rulemaking proposal” to implement disclosure rules in light of Citizens United.). 
96 See Trevor Potter, How the FEC Can Stop the Tidal Wave of Secret Political Cash, Wash Post (Nov 16, 2012), 
online at http:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-the-fec-can-stop-the-tidal-wave-of-secret-political-
cash/2012/11/16/966c48cc-2dae-11e2-89d4-040c9330702a_story.html (visited Jan 10, 2014).  The commission 
deadlocked in two 3-3 votes on draft NPRM documents as well: 11-02, draft A, and 11-02-A, at the January 20, 
2011, meeting. See Federal Election Commission, Minutes of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election 
Commission 4–5 (Jan 20, 2011), online at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2011/approved2011_06.pdf (visited Jan 10, 
2014). See also Federal Election Commission, Minutes of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission 
3–4 (June 15, 2011), online at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2011/approved2011_39.pdf (visited Jan 10, 2014).   
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impasse.  While exogenous changes such as different voting rules could be 
ameliorative, doctrinal innovations may be warranted instead when 
institutional reforms are unlikely.97  One reason this approach may be 
prudent in the election context is that achieving legislative agreement on 
election reform may be difficult, if not impossible, without attached 
conditions such as the even-numbered bipartisan boards that lead to 
deadlock in the first place.   
 Such design choices for election-related agencies like the FEC and 
EAC likely reflect the congressional desire to ensure that controversial 
election policies do not proceed unless it serves the interests of both parties 
as reflected in a bipartisan majority vote.  But, while bipartisan consensus 
would be the first-best outcome, what is a court to do when required to 
review the conflicting statutory interpretations of split commissioners in 
constitutional or APA-based suits — should it determine the issue itself or 
defer to a particular agency actor?  Answering this question requires a 
comparative analysis of the institutional competencies of agency and 
judicial actors in election-related interpretation.  Absent the first-best 
bipartisan decision, courts should search for second-best solutions by 
seeking guidance from actors more experienced with the statute’s 
administration.   
 The situation frequently arises when the underlying statute itself 
provides for judicial review of a deadlocked decision or, alternatively, when 
the suit is brought on constitutional grounds.  In Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Commission (DCCC) v. FEC, for example, the D.C. Circuit 
observed that the Federal Election Campaign Act allowed for judicial 
review of agency proceedings that resulted in complaint dismissals.98  As 
background, FEC enforcement proceedings are initiated either by a 
complaint filed with the FEC, usually by a candidate or political party, or by 
the FEC itself after its review of political committee reports.99  Once 
initiated, the General Counsel’s office evaluates the matter and provides a 
recommendation to the six-member Commission indicating whether there is 
“reason to believe” a violation has occurred or is about to occur. Should a 
majority of the Commission concur with the General Counsel’s finding, the 
FEC then attempts to reach a conciliation agreement through informal 
negotiation with the potential violators.  If negotiation does not resolve the 
                                                 
97 See Cass R. Sunstein and Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 Duke L J 2193, 2193–94 
(2009). 
98 See Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) v Federal Election Commission, 831 F2d 1131 
(DC Cir 1987) (noting that FECA explicitly states that “[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the Commission 
dismissing a complaint filed by such party . . . or by a failure of the Commission to act on such complaint during 
the 120–day period beginning on the date the complaint is filed, may file a petition with the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia” (citing 2 USC § 437g(a)(8)(A)). 
99 2 USC § 437g(a)(1)–(2). 
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matter, then the Commission can work with the DOJ to file suit in district 
court.100   
 Under this scheme, the DCCC plaintiffs had filed a complaint 
alleging that the National Republican Campaign Committee had improperly 
failed to allocate the cost of a mailing campaign against the relevant FECA 
spending cap.  The complaint’s validity turned on whether the mailer 
constituted an “electioneering message.”  The FEC’s General Counsel 
found reason to believe that it was, based on two previous commission 
advisory opinions interpreting the statutory term.  When the FEC voted, 
however, only three Commissioners agreed.  With four votes required for 
further action, the complaint was dismissed.101 
 In litigation, the FEC argued that the deadlock should be 
unreviewable since it purportedly resolved no substantive issue.102  The 
court pointed out, however, that dismissals based on 5-1 or even 6-0 votes 
could similarly fail to resolve a decision substantively since the basis for the 
votes are often unclear.  Perhaps the votes were the product of logrolling, 
legal uncertainty or a judgment that the decision should be deferred; as a 
result, the FEC’s argument rang hollow.  In the alternative, the FEC argued 
that deadlocks were merely unreviewable exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion in deciding not to pursue a complaint.  Again, however, the court 
rejected the argument on the grounds that 3-3 deadlocks could not be 
distinguished from 6-0 decisions to dismiss a complaint, decisions that were 
clearly reviewable under FECA.   
 As a result, the D.C. Circuit then took an intra-agency disagreement 
between an insulated internal actor — the General Counsel — and a split 
commission as reason to take closer look at the proffered legal rationales of 
both sets of actors.  Specifically, it held that when the FEC’s General 
Counsel recommends an affirmative agency action but the agency’s 
politically-appointed commissioners deadlock on the recommendation, the 
commissioners must provide a statement of reviewable reasons.103   
Importantly, this reason-giving requirement was justified, at least initially, 
only in situations when the internal staff actor disagreed with the 
deadlocked commission. 
Without this requirement, the panel noted, it would be impossible 
for a court to “intelligently determine” whether the commissioners were 
acting contrary to law or in an arbitrary-and-capricious manner.104  The 
                                                 
100 2 USC § 437g(a)(1)–(2). 
101 DCCC, 831 F2d at 1132. 
102 Id at 1133. 
103 See Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) v Federal Election Commission, 831 F2d 1131 
(DC Cir 1987). See also Common Cause v Federal Election Commission, 842 F2d 436 (DC Cir 1988) (reaffirming 
requirement for FEC to provide reasons for deadlock when General Counsel recommends otherwise, but declining 
to apply requirement retroactively). 
104 Id at 1132. 
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FEC, that is, sent worrisome signals of arbitrariness in the form of 
“conflicting messages” when the FEC dismissed a complaint without a 
rationale, despite seemingly contrary precedents identified by the FEC’s 
own General Counsel.105  A later D.C. Circuit opinion offered other policy 
justifications for the requirement: it helped to ensure intra-agency reflection 
and deliberation, contributed to better reasoned outcomes, and also provided 
an opportunity for agency self-correction.106  Indeed, one way to understand 
this common law requirement is in terms of the court’s recognition that a 
conflict between a senior career staff member (here, the General Counsel 
with a reputation for independence107) and a deadlocked board merited 
closer review of the latter.  By imposing a reason-giving requirement, the 
court helped to ensure that the agency’s internal expertise could be brought 
to bear on the commission’s eventual resolution.         
 The next critical question that arises, then, is which interpretive 
statement of reasons courts should review and grant deference to, if at all.  
Possibilities include the initial interpretation of the FEC’s General Counsel, 
the separate opinions of the commissioners, or a de novo interpretation by 
the court itself.  Of these, the D.C. Circuit has puzzlingly held that 
statements issued by the bloc of commissioners voting against agency 
enforcement should constitute the prevailing interpretation and, what is 
more, that they would be entitled to Chevron deference — that is, deference 
to “permissible” interpretations of statutes that are otherwise ambiguous.108  
The court’s first premise was that the commissioners who voted to dismiss 
the complaint “constitute[d] a controlling group” and thus its “rationale 
necessarily states the agency’s reasons for acting as it did.”109  Note, 
however, that the dismissing group comprised the “controlling” faction only 
because the decision to pursue the enforcement required a majority.   
 The court further reasoned that Chevron deference was due since the 
underlying statute itself evinced a legislative intent to delegate that 
interpretive authority and the agency exercised that authority.110  Such 
intent can ordinarily be inferred when Congress grants an agency the power 
to act with the force of law through formalized procedures like notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, and the agency employed 
                                                 
105 Id at 1133. 
106 See Common Cause, 842 F2d at 449. 
107 See Bob Bauer, The Federal Election Commission and its Choice of a General Counsel, More Soft Money 
Hard Law (June 7, 2013), online at http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/06/fec-general-counsel/ (visited 
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108 See Federal Election Commission v National Republican Senatorial Committee, 966 F2d 1476 (DC Cir 
1992).  Agencies are currently accorded Chevron deference to interpretations of statutes which they administer.  
Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 842 (1984).  Chevron’s two-part test 
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Two, courts ask whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible” and, if so, defer accordingly. Id at 842–43.   
109 Id at 1476. 
110 See United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 US 218, 226-27 (2001). 
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those procedures.111  Because FECA’s adjudicatory scheme was analogous 
to formal adjudication in essentially creating an adversarial process between 
the FEC’s General Counsel and the respondent,112 the D.C. Circuit reasoned 
that Chevron applied to the controlling opinions of deadlocked decisions.  
The court further noted, even more oddly, that the “Commission is 
inherently bipartisan in that no more than three of its six voting members 
may be of the same political party” as further reason for deference.113   
 The D.C. Circuit’s approach, however, fails to appreciate election-
specific concerns amidst the structure of agencies like the FEC.  Namely, it 
does not recognize that a deadlocked vote within an election-related agency 
is functionally different than a majority vote in favor of complaint 
dismissal, which would constitute an affirmative, bipartisan decision not to 
enforce the statute in a particular way.  Whereas a majority vote in the 
election setting connotes party agreement, a deadlock suggests the 
converse: a vote split along party lines. Such an outcome is particularly 
problematic in election administration since a deadlock in favor of inaction 
and the status quo can privilege incumbents who were elected according to 
the existing rules.   
Framed in this way, it becomes easier to see why courts should not 
grant Chevron deference to the deadlock coalition that successfully blocks 
the agency determination.  First, as a doctrinal matter, an agency must 
affirmatively exercise its power to act with the force of law in order to 
receive deference.114  To the contrary, an FEC deadlock is not an exercise of 
lawmaking authority and thus does not warrant judicial respect when 
hamstrung along party lines.  Second, the rationale of Chevron is firmly 
grounded in presumed legislative intent (however fictional).115  As a result, 
granting deference to a non-majority block of a deadlocked panel would be 
contrary to what Congress intended by creating a majority voting rule on a 
bipartisan commission.  Finally, from a more dynamic perspective, granting 
Chevron deference to an agency tie blunts the incentives of commissioners 
to seek bipartisan consensus;  by contrast, withholding such deference until 
a majority is achieved is more likely to foster the cooperation across party 
lines that Congress desired. 
 
 
                                                 
111 Id. at 229-31. 
112 See In re Sealed Case, 223 F3d 775, 780 (DC Cir 2000). 
113 In re Sealed Case, 223 F3d at 781 (emphasis added) citing Federal Election Commission v Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 US 27, 37 (1981).  
114 See note 110 and accompanying text. 
115 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo L J 833, 870-72 (2001) (noting that 
the Chevron rationale that “finds the most support in the Court's own language” is that such deference “arises out 
of background presumptions of congressional intent”) (internal quotations omitted); Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 516-17.   
21 
 
B. Internal Independence 
 
 If Chevron is misplaced when agencies deadlock, courts are then left 
to evaluate the persuasiveness of agency interpretations for themselves, 
pursuant to what is known as Skidmore deference.116  Under this test, courts 
look at a number of Skidmore factors such as the “thoroughness” of the 
agency’s consideration, the reasoning’s “validity” and “consistency” and, 
more generally, any factors which give an interpretation power to persuade, 
if lacking power to control.”117  The analysis applies even when the agency 
itself is not a party, as was the case with the EAC in Intertribal.  Given the 
unique concerns of federal election administration, the primary Skidmore 
factor in the electoral setting should be the extent to which the agency actor 
is institutionally insulated from partisan influence.  Instead of blindly 
allowing the default controlling bloc to definitively interpret an underlying 
statute, that is, courts should look instead at the interpretation of the actor 
most likely to bring to bear the agency’s expertise and administrative 
experience.  
While this approach would not necessarily modify Skidmore’s 
multi-factor analysis as such, it would shift its emphasis and place the 
identity of the decision-maker in the foreground when the agency regulates 
elections.118  Such Skidmore inquiries, for example, would look at indicia of 
political independence, such as tenure and salary protections, methods of 
appointment, and the degree of professionalization, among other 
dimensions.  It would apply to the myriad informal ways in which insulated 
agency actors attempt to provide guidance drawn from their expertise.  
Internally insulated expertise, for example, is frequently generated by career 
staff within agencies, primarily through sub-regulatory informal guidance 
documents.  There are both senior career officials who hold positions in the 
Senior Executive Service or otherwise upper management General Schedule 
positions as well as the more “rank-and-file career workforce.”119  In 
                                                 
116 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134 (1944).  Skidmore considered whether the time workers spent on 
call for a packing plant constituted “working time” due overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  
In an amicus brief, the Department of Labor’s Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (who had 
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117 Id. at 140. 
118 This emphasis would help to guide courts application of Skidmore, which can otherwise be less directed and 
more ad hoc.  See Kristen E. Hickman and Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 
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drawing the line between senior and junior career employees would follow the Supreme Court’s approach in 
United States v National Treasury Employees Union engaging in a First Amendment analysis of an honoraria ban 
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addition to career staff, agencies also often use advisory committees to 
provide technical advice or recommendations, subject to federal laws 
regulating the disclosure and openness of meetings.120  While courts 
currently do not apply formal deference doctrines to advisory committees, 
courts could critically review agency rejections of expert advisory 
committee opinions, especially when those opinions are required by 
statute.121  
This institutional approach is especially appropriate in federal 
election administration given its heightened concerns over self-dealing and 
partisanship.  While Skidmore speaks broadly of the “agency,” treating the 
“agency” as a monolithic entity makes little sense here.  In Peter Strauss’ 
words, the “anthropomorphic tendency to treat agencies as if they were a 
single human actor is particularly distracting and distorting when one is 
analyzing a medium that the constituent elements of complex institutions 
use to speak to each other.”122  Indeed, agencies operate according to 
sophisticated internal decision-making processes and personnel decisions 
often informed by the very expertise-related factors that courts attempt to 
otherwise address in an institutional vacuum.  One important way that 
judges, like ordinary individuals, evaluate the persuasiveness or credibility 
of an analysis is by looking at the author’s identity and the related 
probability of bias and/or sound expertise.  Expert witnesses in court, for 
example, are regularly called upon to disclose their conflicts-of-interest and 
related professional background.123   
 The notion of looking at the institutional role of the interpretive 
actor when deciding whether and how to grant deference is not new.  The 
perspective has been advanced by two current members of the Court, 
among others.  Justice Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Mead 
Corporation, for example, advocated for a deference regime that would 
simply look to whether the interpretation is “authoritative” in the sense that 
it “represents the official position of the agency.”124  Because the custom 
letter’s interpretation in Mead had been ratified by the General Counsel of 
the Treasury and the Solicitor General in briefs, Chevron deference in his 
                                                                                                                            
Schedule level 16 (GS-16) on the federal government’s pay scale.  United States v National Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 US 454, 472, 478 (1995).    
120 See, for example, Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 USC App 2 §§ 1–16; Freedom of Information 
Act, 5 USC § 552(b). 
 121 See, for example, American Farm Bureau Federation v EPA, 559 F3d 512, 521 (DC Cir 2009) (“The EPA 
failed adequately to explain its reason for not accepting the [Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee]’s 
recommendations . . . .”); Coalition of Battery Recyclers Association v EPA, 604 F3d 613, 619 (DC Cir 2010) 
(favorably noting that the EPA had considered some of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s concerns, 
despite not following its precise recommendations). 
122 See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an 
Essential Element, 53 Admin L Rev 803, 810 (2001). 
123 See, for example, FRCP 26(a)(2) (requiring, among other things, “a complete statement of all opinions the 
witness will express and the basis and reasons for them,” “the facts or data considered by the witness,” and “the 
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124 See 121 S Ct at 2187. 
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view was appropriate.  Developing this idea of looking at the “who” as 
opposed to the “how” of agency decision-making, David Barron and now-
Justice Elena Kagan have similarly argued that courts should give Chevron 
deference when the “congressional delegatee” identified by statute “takes 
personal responsibility for the decision.”125  Such an approach, they 
contend, would encourage more accountable and well-considered agency 
decision-making consistent with Chevron’s underlying policy goals.126 
 While these proposals are Chevron-centered, there are good reasons 
to extend the conceptual move to the Skidmore context as well, particularly 
when the regulatory domain is that of federal election administration.  
Unlike Chevron’s grounding in hypothetical legislative intent, Skidmore’s 
foundations are prudential.127  Skidmore deference recognizes that courts are 
well-equipped to engage in statutory interpretation, but that they can also 
lack the experience and expertise to appreciate the consequences of 
alternative interpretations.  As such, Skidmore asks judges to weigh the 
reasons why an interpretation is persuasive based in part on its source or 
“pedigree.”128   
 Granting Skidmore deference when an informal guidance document 
or letter is prepared and signed by an expert, insulated career staff member 
would privilege the myriad documents and informal guidance reviewed by 
the most experienced actors within an agency, while also incorporating the 
experiences and insights of their subordinates.  Some courts already appear 
to be taking into account such institutional considerations.129  To be sure, 
the participation of high-level political appointees bears many of these same 
benefits in terms of drawing upon the agency’s expertise (indeed, agency 
heads often sign documents or interpretations that were drafted by or with 
the participation of career staff).  But none of these benefits exist when 
political appointees deadlock.   
Functionally, it is important to note that the proposed tailoring in the 
election context would simply encourage a judicial partnership with expert, 
internally insulated actors.  It would not call for judges to abdicate their role 
under Skidmore in reviewing such documents, who would continue to 
consider other factors such as thoroughness and consistency, nor would it 
allow career staff to override a valid majority decision of the commissioners 
when they manage to secure a bipartisan consensus.  Rather, the approach 
developed here would apply when agencies deadlock, and courts are called 
upon to resolve a statutory ambiguity.   
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126 Id at 238. 
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At the same time, one might worry that this deference regime is 
inconsistent with legislative intent.  If Congress had wanted to create an 
expert, non-partisan election administration agency with a permanent staff, 
it could have done so.  Instead, it set up a politically appointed commission 
and protected against partisanship through a bi-partisan voting rule.  The 
point that this objection misses, however, is that Congress also provided for 
judicial review of the agency’s actions, sometimes explicitly as in the case 
of FEC enforcement proceedings or implicitly through a choice not to 
preclude review.130  Thus, the familiar administrative law question is 
whether such reviewable statutory ambiguities are better understood as a 
delegation of interpretive authority to a court acting alone or rather as a 
cooperative endeavor between courts and expert agency actors when 
commissioners deadlock.    
This interpretive approach is especially warranted given the 
comparative institutional weaknesses of courts relative to career staff or 
advisory commissions in this arena.  While federal judges are politically 
insulated by virtue of Article III tenure and salary protections, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that they are hardly immune from partisan loyalties 
and, to the contrary, often vote in ways that favor their appointing party.131  
Moreover, most election administration litigation is fact-intensive and arises 
in a procedural posture that often requires courts to expedite their 
consideration of the claims based on incomplete records.  As a result, 
judges must intervene without the requisite data to inform their decisions.  
These institutional weaknesses, coupled with the charged political nature of 
the cases render courts (and particularly the Supreme Court) ill-suited to 
resolve election-related disputes.132     
By contrast, career staff within administrative agencies also have 
various salary and tenure protections but, in addition, possess experience 
and expertise in administrating federal elections.  Such staff are protected, 
for example, by the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, which prohibits agency 
personnel decisions not taken on the basis of merit.133  They also have 
“strict tenure guarantees, have no expressed ties to the administration or to 
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Congress, and by law are to be politically neutral.”134  Furthermore, civil 
service salaries are protected from political appropriations decisions and the 
wages are fairly compressed within the federal pay structure.135 
Moreover, these internal agency actors also possess the resources to 
gather information across jurisdictions over longer periods of time.  Indeed, 
it was this need for reliable data that originally spurred Congress to create a 
number of bureaucratic entities charged with researching cross-cutting 
election administration issues.  In 1971, for example, Congress created the 
Office of Federal Elections within what is now known as the General 
Accountability Office.136  It was moved in 1974 to the FEC where it 
eventually became known as the Office of Election Administration, before 
its staff and functions were finally later transferred to the EAC.137  During 
its various evolutions, the office commissioned a number of influential 
election administration studies.138  In addition, it created advisory boards 
and disseminated information to state and local election administrators.  
While housed in the EAC, the staff has formulated voluntary voting system 
guidelines, compiled data and reports on absentee ballots for overseas 
voters, and tested and certified voting system hardware and software.139   
In this manner, one of the main functions of federal election-related 
agencies has been to aggregate, develop, and solicit information about 
election practices across various states and even from overseas.  Election 
administration decisions should take into account this accumulated 
storehouse of information and, in the context of statutory interpretation, 
should consider an interpretation’s persuasiveness by virtue of the 
experience and insulated institutional role of its author.  When the role is 
that of making recommendations to politically-appointed commissioners 
based on previous experience administering the statute, then judges would 
be especially wise to consider those views.  
 
C.  Implications and Objections 
 
 Returning now to Intertribal, it is useful to see how the Court’s 
analysis might have differed when applying the institutional Skidmore 
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139 Id. 
26 
 
approach developed here.  Namely, this view of Skidmore would have 
drawn the Court to consider the EAC executive director’s institutional role 
and opinion letter in light of the agency’s deadlock, instead of ignoring the 
letter altogether as a basis for decision.  Recall that, although the EAC is 
vested with rulemaking authority,140 the commission split along party lines 
as to how to resolve the statutory ambiguity: how must states “accept and 
use” the federal registration form?  Because it ignored the EAC executive 
director’s opinion, the Intertribal Court did not explicitly consider how 
much weight to give the letter, though the issue was raised in the merits 
briefs and the Court conceded that the statute was ambiguous.141   
Judge Kozinski, concurring in the Ninth Circuit’s first panel 
decision below, however, did consider the question.  First, he observed that 
the director’s opinion letter lacked the “force of law” and therefore did not 
merit Chevron deference.142  He further noted that courts did not normally 
grant deference to agency preemption determinations contained in informal 
opinion letters, but rather applied Skidmore.143  While the Ninth Circuit 
majority acknowledged that Skidmore analysis could be appropriate, it 
declined to apply it on the grounds that the NVRA’s legislative history and 
the EAC executive director’s view were both consistent with the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding.144  In this manner, the panel, like the Supreme Court, 
interpreted the NVRA independently on its own and without reference to 
the EAC director’s own well-reasoned analysis.145     
The EAC’s executive director is a senior staff position with a 
renewable four-year appointment “responsible for implementing EAC 
policy and administering EAC’s day-to-day operations.”146  He is appointed 
by a majority vote of the commission, whose members could only consider 
three nominations chosen from a search committee appointed by the EAC’s 
Standards Board and Board of Advisors.147  As such, the position requires 
the bipartisan vote of the commission only after nomination by expert 
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advisory boards.  The director’s duties, in turn, include maintaining the 
federal voter registration form and answering questions regarding the 
application of the NVRA and HAVA consistent with EAC’s guidance 
documents, regulations, advisories and policy statements.148  Though the 
chair of the EAC is charged with providing administrative direction to the 
executive director, that direction is not to be undertaken without input from 
each commissioner.149   
As such, the EAC executive director has experience administering 
the agency’s authorizing federal statutes across states and jurisdictions.  
Moreover, the executive director is likely to have a sound professional 
reputation as well as productive relationships with the state and local 
election officials who had nominated him (which the executive director in 
this case in fact did have).150  Thus, there were multiple reasons to believe 
that norms of professionalism and expertise helped to bolster the 
independence of his position.  In interpreting the NVRA, the Court would 
have benefited from considering the EAC executive director’s interpretive 
opinion for its persuasiveness in light of the institutional position of its 
author.  While it is true that the Court’s substantive conclusion happened to 
align with that of the director in this case, such contingencies do not warrant 
the lack of judicial attention to insulated agency actors in future cases. 
 Turning now to other implications of the Skidmore approach 
developed here, courts should conversely be more hesitant to grant 
deference to agency actors that lack the structural protections against 
partisan influence of the kind that existed for the EAC’s executive 
director.151  Indeed, the increasing sense that the DOJ — recall, an 
executive agency with a single, appointed agency head — had politicized its 
interpretations under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) may help to explain the 
Supreme Court’s general refusal to defer to the agency.152  Indeed, one 
analysis describes the Court’s recent approach as one of “anti-deference” 
and even “hostility.”153  Helping to explain this judicial skepticism, perhaps, 
was the perception that the DOJ had been issuing sub-regulatory documents 
that were evolving according to the administration’s partisan affiliation.  In 
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this sense, the approach proposed here may help to articulate what has 
already been happening as a matter of course.  
 To facilitate Section Five’s preclearance process, for example, the 
DOJ first published an interpretive rule for public comment in 1971 under 
the Republican President Nixon.154  The proposal initially provided that the 
Attorney General would object to a preclearance submission only if he or 
she affirmatively determined that the law would have a discriminatory 
effect or purpose.  In practice, this required showing constituted a more 
onerous standard than had previously existed.  The final guidelines issued a 
few months later, by contrast, called for the Attorney General to object even 
if the evidence was still indeterminate — a change prompted only by 
countervailing pressure from congressional and civil rights groups.155   
 The evolution of the guidelines, with revisions in 1981 and 1987, 
continued to reflect attempts to track the shifting views of the 
administration in power.156  For example, in 1985, Republican President 
Reagan’s DOJ initially proposed that it would refuse preclearance under 
Section 5 using Section 2’s result-oriented test, that is, only if the 
allegations showed by “clear and convincing evidence” that the change had 
a discriminatory result.157  This policy shift would have reversed the 
previous burden of proof under Section 5 and set a new higher evidentiary 
standard.  In response to legislative hearings and public criticism, however, 
the DOJ’s finalized 1987 guidelines instead eliminated the burden shift and 
incorporated a results test with only a “clear” evidentiary standard.158   
 More recently, in 2010, Democratic President Obama’s DOJ 
published a notice proposing amendments for public comment.159  Among 
other things, the proposal sought to reflect legislative changes to Section 
Five, which clarified that the term “purpose” included “any discriminatory 
purpose” and not just those that reflected an intention to retrogress, thus 
potentially expanding Section Five liability.  Moreover, the regulations also 
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Revision of Procedures, 50 Fed Reg 19,122 (proposed May 6, 1985) (to be codified at 28 CFR pt 51); Revision of 
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed Reg 486-01 (Jan 6, 1987) 
(codified at 28 CFR § 51.55). See also Steven F. Lawson, In Pursuit of Power: Southern Blacks & Electoral 
Politics, 1965–1982, 158–90 (Columbia 1985); Krousser, 86 Tex L Rev at 716 (cited in note 155) (“Like the 
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157 Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965; Proposed Revision of 
Procedures, 50 Fed Reg 19,122, 19,131 (proposed May 6, 1985) (to be codified at 28 CFR pt 51). 
158 Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed Reg 486 
(codified at 28 CFR §51.55). See Krousser, 86 Tex L Rev at 718 (cited in note 155). 
159 See, for example, Revisions of the Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 75 
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clarified the nature of DOJ’s “bailout” process for covered jurisdictions, 
including political subunits that were now eligible to bring a declaratory 
judgment suit under Section Five.160  In April 2011, the DOJ issued the final 
rule as an interpretive rule without major changes from the proposal.161   
 At the same time, numerous accounts have attested to the DOJ’s 
increasingly politicized administration of the VRA across both Republican 
and Democratic administrations.  Various reports have circulated, for 
instance, suggesting that Bush Administration DOJ officials had prohibited 
career staff attorneys from offering written recommendations in high-profile 
VRA determinations.162  Not only did this new practice “mark[] a 
significant change in the procedures meant to insulate such decisions from 
politics,” but it also followed on the heels of rare reversals by high-level 
political officials of career staff preclearance recommendations.163  This 
dynamic of silencing or overruling internal dissent appears to have 
continued through the Obama Administration,164 though recent DOJ 
officials have attempted to publicly distance themselves from such practices 
and profess to no longer prohibit written career staff opinions.165  In this 
manner, the same executive agency which had been silencing its career 
attorneys had also been issuing guidance that sought to reflect the 
preferences of the political appointees in power.  The Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to grant deference under these circumstances, to agency actors 
that lacked internal mechanisms of political independence, would be 
consistent with the analysis developed here.      
 However persuasive the institutional Skidmore approach as an 
explanatory matter, one might still normatively object to it on the grounds 
                                                 
160 Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v Holder, 557 US 193 (2009). 
161 See Revision of Voting Rights Procedures, 76 Fed Reg 21,239 (April 15, 2011); Guidance Concerning 
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162 See Dan Eggen, Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases, Wash Post A3 (Dec 10, 2005); Edward M. 
Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 Harv L & Pol Rev 211, 218–19 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s 
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Rights Division, announcing that DOJ had ended the previous practice of not allowing career staff attorneys from 
offering written recommendations in voting rights cases). 
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that it would result in the heightened probability for internal agency actor 
capture.  Because courts would place a thumb on the scale for sub-
regulatory guidance documents written by, say, senior career staff, 
independent general counsels, or advisory committee members, political 
parties would simply refocus their lobbying efforts accordingly.  While this 
possibility is a real concern, the objection is muted first by the observation 
that reputations for election administrators are strongly dependent on their 
perceived independence from special interests and adherence to professional 
norms.166  To be an effective election administrator depends on maintaining 
actual and perceived independence from parties and candidates.   
In addition, the incentives for capture are mitigated by various 
federal laws limiting the influence of interest groups and parties on civil 
servants.  The Pendleton Act, for example, prohibits agencies from making 
certain non-merit-based personnel actions and sends appeals of such 
decisions to an independent Merit Systems Protection Board.167  Moreover, 
the Hatch Act restricts executive branch civil servants from engaging in 
partisan political activity.168  If there was evidence in the record to suggest 
that the internally insulated agency actor was in fact captured, the proffered 
interpretation would be less persuasive under Skidmore.   
 By the same token, another objection might be that political 
appointees would now be more likely to increase their monitoring and 
control of staff memoranda, thereby undermining existing opportunities for 
publicly available expertise.  If courts are more likely to defer to informal 
opinions from institutionally insulated actors, that is, then agency heads 
may simply reduce the amount of otherwise useful guidance, as occurred 
with the DOJ’s silencing of career staff written opinions.  More 
problematically, individual political appointees may even attempt to directly 
edit or manipulate the contents of such documents themselves.   
In such circumstances, again, note that any evidence of political 
manipulation would render staff interpretations non-persuasive.  As for 
potentially silenced expertise, political appointees are often constrained by 
powerful norms of independence and internal institutional practices like the 
DOJ written career staff opinions developed to instantiate them.169  The 
DOJ, for its part, was heavily criticized in the media and elsewhere for the 
perceived politicization of the VRA.170  In this manner, the credibility and 
reputation of election-related agencies may serve as a longer-run check on 
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efforts to otherwise stifle internally insulated actors.  Moreover, staff 
recommendations are not only made internally to high-level officials, but 
are also required by the need to provide guidance to outside regulated 
entities.  As a result, there will always be an external demand for sub-
regulatory guidance despite internal pressures not to issue any.  Finally, 
such staff manipulations would be particularly difficult under multi-member 
commissions since other commissioners could object to such efforts. 
One might nevertheless still be concerned about the possible 
dynamic effects of this deference regime.  Perhaps judicial deference to 
senior career staff when they are structurally insulated would erode these 
norms of independence over time or essentially entrench partisanship even 
deeper within the agency.  The best response may simply be a pragmatic 
one.  The more an election-related agency loses its institutional credibility, 
either because of capture, corruption, or a failure to incorporate new data, 
the more likely other institutions like the courts or the legislature may be to 
step in to check it.  This dynamic, as discussed, is one possible explanation 
for the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant deference to an increasingly 
politicized DOJ.  A similar argument has been made to explain the Court’s 
withholding of deference from the EPA’s refusal to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions — namely, because of the Court’s perception that there had been 
high-level political interference with the expert, scientific judgments of 
EPA career staff.171    
 More broadly, these worrisome possibilities may be alleviated by 
other strategic internal incentives.  Namely, the commissioners tempted to 
silence or otherwise unduly influence the recommendations of their staff are 
faced with a tradeoff between reaching a bipartisan decision and gaining 
Chevron deference, which favors the agency, or settling for Skidmore 
deference, which leaves interpretive authority with the courts.  Faced with 
this choice, the appointed commissioners can gain more deference by 
securing a majority agreement, instead of leaving open the ambiguity to the 
uncertainties of Skidmore as a result of partisan deadlock.  In this manner, 
there are relative incentives for commissioners to avoid administrative 
impasse and devote resources to finding bipartisan interpretations rather 
than micromanaging informal staff documents. 
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IV. FEDERAL ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
 
Ongoing litigation regarding Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship 
requirements, as in a recent case brought against the EAC itself, will 
continue to highlight the intersection between federal election and 
administrative law.172  Among other issues will be the question identified by 
Justice Scalia in Intertribal — now arising out of legislative, as opposed to 
administrative, deadlock: Can agencies without any appointed 
commissioners still act on behalf of the agency?  To date, in response to a 
court order, the professional staff of the EAC has issued a memorandum 
arguing that the staff possesses the sub-delegated authority under the 
circumstances to resolve state requests to amend the federal form.173  In 
light of recent changes to filibuster rules, the issue may soon become moot 
as a practical matter if Congress moves ahead on potential EAC 
nominations.174  Other important issues to be resolved include whether and 
when the EAC’s decisions can be considered final, reviewable actions under 
the APA.       
While this article’s analysis of the comparative institutional 
competence of insulated career staff may help to bolster the EAC’s 
arguments going forward, this final Part offers some broader reflections 
about how administrative law may be adapted in the electoral context — 
themes to be more fully developed in future work.  Indeed, administrative 
law, as traditionally conceived, is trans-substantive.  It presumes principles 
generally applicable across a number of agencies and formulates its 
doctrines accordingly.175  There are many reasons to think, however, that 
such doctrines should be adapted to the election administration context in 
ways that recognize the domain’s unique concerns.   
                                                 
172 See Kobach v. The United States Election Assistance Commission, 13-cv-04095 (D Kan 2013). 
173 Election Assistance Commission, Memorandum of Decision Concerning State Requests to Include Additional 
Proof of Citizenship Instructions On the National Mail Voter Registration Form 14-20 (Jan 17, 2014), online at 
http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/20140117%20EAC%20Final%20Decision%20on%20Proof%20of%20Ci
tizenship%20Requests%20-%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Jan 12, 2014). 
174 See Committee on Rules and Administration, Election Assistance Commission Nomination Business Meeting, 
online at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=CommitteeHearings&ContentRecord_id=cebb0cf6-
c060-43b3-a600-ea6eaa00693c&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-
56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=1983a2a8-4fc3-4062-a50e-7997351c154b&MonthDisplay=2&YearDisplay=2014 (last 
visited Feb 5, 2014). 
175 See Richard E. Levy and Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 Tex L Rev 499, 499–500 
(2011) (“As a field of legal study and practice, administrative law rests on the premise that legal principles 
concerning agency structure, administrative process, and judicial review cut across multiple agencies” and noting 
that the “premise certainly holds true for iconic administrative law decisions like Chenery, Overton Park, Florida 
East Coast Railway, Vermont Yankee, State Farm, and Chevron, which are widely cited and applied”) (citations 
omitted); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law From Jackson to Lincoln, 
1829-1861, 117 Yale L J 1568, 1688 (2008) (observing that the “jurisprudence generated through judicial review 
of administrative action enunciates general principles and is almost necessarily transsubstantive,” which are then 
reinforced by “framework statutes, like the Administrative Procedure Act or the National Environmental Policy 
Act, and from executive orders such as those that have incrementally established the regulatory review process at 
the Office of Management and Budget”). 
33 
 
In recent years, judges and scholars alike have begun to recognize 
the potential wisdom of such tailored approaches.  Richard Levy and Robert 
Glicksman, for example, observe a phenomenon they call “agency-specific 
precedents.”176  Precedents are agency-specific when a court only cites them 
for a particular agency in other cases involving that agency, even when the 
cited principles are supposedly general in nature.  What is particularly 
striking about the practice is that courts have begun to modify these 
principles to accommodate particular agency characteristics.177  One 
traditional articulation of arbitrary-and-capricious review, for example, asks 
“whether the [agency] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant 
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”178  In the 
narrow contexts of the Federal Communications Commission and Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, however, Levy and Glicksman note that 
courts regularly invoke a different verbal formulation — simply that of 
“reasoned decisionmaking.”179  They argue that this alternative approach 
emphasizes a more rational decision-making process, as opposed to a focus 
on the substance of the decision itself.  One potential explanation they offer 
is that the agencies at issue engage in ratemaking and licensing in regulated 
industries, which place a greater emphasis on procedural protections.180   
To the extent courts are already de facto adapting administrative law 
principles to the shared concerns of particular agencies, a related possibility 
is that such customization should recognize the unique problems of federal 
election administration.  The idea arises from the analogous argument that 
the exceptional nature of elections warrants particularized constitutional 
doctrines.  In this view, the First Amendment, for example, should give 
some kinds of electoral speech less protection relative to non-electoral 
speech in order to facilitate the heightened contest of ideas during election 
season.181  The Equal Protection Clause too has received election-specific 
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modifications.  The Supreme Court’s recent redistricting cases, for instance, 
have allowed for more race-conscious line-drawing than in other equal 
protection arenas, with the Court adopting a “predominant” factor rather 
than a “motivating” factor test for identifying impermissible racial 
motive.182  One rationale is that voters voluntarily identify by race when 
forming political organizations, thus necessitating the recognition of 
legitimate group interests in the redistricting process.183  Similarly, Baker v. 
Carr’s one-person, one-vote standard is unique as one of the only contexts 
in which strict scrutiny is applied in the absence of a discriminatory purpose 
or suspect classification and has “imposed a mathematical rigor on the 
redistricting process that no other species of equal protection law 
required.”184  Partisan gerrymandering doctrines too allow the state to 
intentionally disadvantage the otherwise constitutionally protected 
characteristic of political affiliation.185 
 These election-specific constitutional doctrines also have statutory 
analogues.  Richard Hasen, for instance, identifies “democracy canons” of 
interpretation in state courts and advocates their use in federal settings as 
well.186  Such canons generally seek to “give effect to the will of the 
majority” and “prevent the disenfranchisement of legal voters” when 
election-related statutes are otherwise ambiguous.187  When applied, they 
usually counsel in favor of allowing ballots to be cast and counted and to 
enable candidates to appear on ballots.188  Just as constitutional and 
statutory concerns might take on novel dimensions when elections are at 
issue, so too might administrative law’s worries about non-arbitrariness, 
transparency, and reasoned decision-making, among others.  What works 
wholesale, that is, may need retail-level refinement.  
 Indeed, one of administrative law’s central concerns is how to 
legitimate government action by an unelected bureaucracy through 
doctrines and procedures grounded in both political accountability and 
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expertise.  Along the first dimension, the non-delegation doctrine, for 
instance, requires that broad delegations of legislative power are constrained 
by an “intelligible principle”189 to which legislators can be held responsible.  
Given Congress’ broad delegations in practice, however, the President has 
also become an important locus of accountability, particularly through his 
appointment, removal, and review powers.190  Central to these 
accountability-grounded accounts is the notion that federal elections can 
help to ensure that regulatory policies are responsive to the democratic will.   
In the context of election regulation, however, the political control 
model falters.  Instead of relying on elections as an exogenous check on the 
regulatory process, election administration influences the election outcomes 
themselves.  As a result, there is a potential circularity: the very source of 
legitimacy for the agency action is a function of the agency action itself.  In 
these circumstances, elections are a less reliable check on agency decision-
making when they instead reflect partisan efforts to distort signals of voter 
approval or disapproval.191  Related are familiar fears of partisan 
entrenchment, the worry that an appointed administrator can manipulate the 
voting process to keep their favored party in power.192   
Potentially more appropriate, then, is another familiar framework for 
justifying the delegation of policymaking authority: one grounded in the 
agency’s superior expertise and experience.  Hard look review helps to 
ensure that agencies make factual and scientific judgments based on the 
evidence available in the record.193  Indeed, as this article has argued, 
federal election administration can benefit greatly from states’ experiences 
as well as from lessons learned from previous federal election cycles.194  
Many of the recent debates about voter identification revolve around 
contested facts regarding the true rates of voter fraud or racial 
disenfranchisement.  In response, some have proposed information-forcing 
reforms such as electoral impact statements195 or the application of risk 
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regulation principles.196  In this manner, the legitimacy of a federal election 
agency depends heavily on its ability to rationalize and inform electoral 
administration. 
At the same time, purely non-partisan rationales grounded solely in 
expertise may be naïve in a context where administrators are appointed or 
hired by individuals with partisan affiliations.197  Many election regulations 
also require line-drawing exercises — as in Intertribal’s question of how 
much information is “necessary” to enforce voter qualifications — which 
often cannot be answered by reference to pure expertise, but are rather 
discretionary exercises of judgment.  As a result, election administration 
may also need other sources of legitimacy.   
Perhaps one possibility suggested by this article’s analysis is that of 
bipartisanship, the extent to which a regulatory decision has been agreed to 
by both political parties in a two-party system.  This criteria would mirror 
the structural choices made by Congress for agencies like the FEC and 
EAC, as discussed.  Relative to single party domination, bipartisan 
decisions may be less suspect given the greater prospect of decisions based 
on the public interest rather than narrowly partisan grounds.  Since they 
require the approval of two parties, bi-partisan decisions are more likely to 
concern the electoral system as a whole, rather than attempts to 
disadvantage a particular party.  Privileging bipartisan requirements may 
also contribute to greater stability over time since they render less likely 
sudden policy shifts due to contingent situations of unified government.198  
The danger with bipartisan decisions, however, arises from the 
concern that political parties will collude to weaken the political process at 
the expense of voters.  Some have argued that this danger is particularly 
acute in the redistricting context, though empirical evidence may suggest 
that such concerns are overstated.199  Because of such worries, neither 
bipartisan, nor expert, non-partisan considerations may be sufficient 
legitimizing rationales on their own.  Rather, perhaps they must operate in 
tandem as proxies to guard against arbitrary regulatory policies designed to 
entrench.  A lack of bipartisanship, for instance, might invite a heightened 
judicial review of the evidence-based rationale for a change in electoral 
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regulation.  Conversely, the presence of bipartisanship might warrant only 
ordinary arbitrary-and-capricious review of the underlying supporting data 
and evidence.200     
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
     
 
 Prior to last Term, election law observers had presciently predicted 
that the future of voting rights would shift from the VRA’s anti-
discrimination model towards more national, uniform approaches that 
“better fit” the increasingly recognized need for consistency across electoral 
jurisdictions.201  Recent events such as the establishment of a presidential 
commission to address federal election administration further signal the 
potentially expanding regulatory presence in this domain. 202  As the 
Intertribal litigation suggests, a federal approach also brings it with the 
greater need for high-quality information and data to justify alternative 
regulatory approaches.  This need is highlighted by the self-professed 
difficulties courts face in gaining this information.   
 To confront this challenge, this article has sought to highlight some 
potentially fruitful intersections between administrative and election law.  
Faced with deadlocks unique to the election context, the analysis developed 
an approach to Skidmore deference that would push courts to focus on the 
information and expertise gained by experienced institutional actors who 
could bring a more birds-eye view across various electoral jurisdictions.  
Future litigation arising out of Intertribal will continue to test the limits of 
judges’ abilities to sort through limited factual records.  At the same time, it 
will rightly bring the dispute firmly back to administrative arenas with the 
tools and doctrines that can help to foster the legitimacy that federal 
election administration demands. 
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